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The Concept of Political Difference in 
Oliver Marchart and its Relationship 
with the Heideggerian Concept of 
Ontological Difference
Abstract
The concept of political difference addresses the distinction between politics and the 
political. The political refers to the ontological making possible of the various domains 
of society, including the domain of politics in a narrow sense. Political difference was 
introduced as a reaction to the theoretical controversy between foundationalism and 
anti-foundationalism. This reaction took the form of post-foundationalism. According 
to Marchart, post-foundationalism does not entirely deny the possibility of grounding. 
It only denies the possibility of an ultimate transcendent foundation insofar as this 
ontological impossibility makes possible the historical and contingent grounds in plural. 
The Heideggerian concept of ontological difference also undermines the possibility 
of an ultimate ontic ground, which establishes the presence of all other beings. If one 
wants to think beyond the concept of ground, one should obtain a clear understanding 
of Being as Being, namely one should grasp the difference between Being and beings. 
All the same, Heidegger tends to replace the ontic grounds of metaphysics with Being 
itself as a new kind of ultimate ontological foundation. Moreover, in many points of 
Heideggerian argumentation one can detect traces of a second alternative understanding 
of ontological difference, which does not belong in Heidegger’s intentions and undermines 
the primordiality of Being. This alternative understanding establishes a reciprocity between 
Being and beings. In our view, political difference not only is based in this second way of 
understanding but, at the same time, develops more decisively the mutual interdependence 
between Being and beings. In political difference the grounding part, namely the political, 
possesses both a grounding as well as a derivative character. Politics and political ground 
and dislocate each other in an incessant and oscillating historical procedure, which 
undermines any form of completion of the social.
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I. Introduction
The concept of the political stands at the forefront of modern thought. The political is not identical to politics. On the contrary, it is the on-tological source which makes possible the different domains of soci-
ety, including the domain of politics in a narrow sense. There is a tension, a 
distinction, between politics and political. This distinction, which came to the 
fore for the first time by Carl Schmitt,1 is known in modern political thought 
as political difference. Schmitt maintained that the political is constituted by 
the distinction between the enemy and the friend. This special distinction is 
contrasted with all other social distinctions and domains, including political 
institutions; this means that the political penetrates all social areas but it 
does not coincide with any of them.2 At the same time, the political is both 
different and identical with the social as a whole. In this sense, the political is 
sharply distinguished from all other social domains (politics, economy, mor-
als, religion, art etc.), but it is also considered as the basis of the social.3
We will examine political difference with the aid of Oliver Marchart’s 
analysis4 and we will compare it with the Heideggerian concept of ontologi-
cal difference.5 Our thesis is that the concept of political difference signifies 
an attempt of modern political thought to develop and transform ontolog-
ical difference. Political difference is not a simple implementation of onto-
logical difference in the field of political philosophy. On the contrary, it pos-
sesses both political and ontological character. Political difference signifies 
the completion of a tendency of philosophy of modernity, which questions 
the possibility of any kind of ontic, transcendental or ontological absolute 
grounding of the real. In our opinion, political difference reveals the neces-
sary impossibility of any form of final and extra-historical grounding of the 
social. Even political difference itself is not excluded from this impossibility. 
In Marchart’s view the notion of political difference was introduced as a 
reaction to the theoretical conflict between foundationalism and anti-foun-
dationalism.6 This reaction took the form of post-foundationalism. Regarding 
political theory, foundationalism advocates that social and political institu-
1 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 26, 38.
2 Ibid., 38.
3 Ibid., 38.
4 Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, 
Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 41-42.
5 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1975), 102.
6 Marchart, 5.
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tions are grounded upon fixed and indisputable principles, which are external 
to politics and society.7 Anti-foundationalism absolutely rejects the possibil-
ity of such principles.8 
Post-foundationalism advocates that since it is impossible for thinking 
to entirely surpass metaphysics, the non-foundational discourse is obliged 
to a certain extend to work inside the field of foundationalism.9 In other 
words, one should undermine metaphysical discourse on ultimate grounds 
without inverting it. Thus, post-foundationalism does not entirely deny the 
possibility of grounding. It only denies the possibility of an ultimate transcen-
dent foundation, as far as this impossibility makes possible the historical and 
contingent grounds in plural.10 In other words, the ontological absence of an 
absolute foundation is a sufficient condition for the possibility of many, rela-
tive or empirical ontic grounds.11 The absence of an ultimate ground does not 
entail the cessation of the process of grounding. On the contrary, the ground 
remains functional as a ground only on the basis of its absence. 
II. The Heideggerian concepts of ontological difference and Ereignis as 
precursors of post-foundationalism and political difference
The Heideggerian concept of ontological difference undermines the idea 
of an ultimate ontic ground, which establishes the presence of all other 
beings. Metaphysics, according to Heidegger, searches for the foundation 
of the presence of beings due to the oblivion of the fact that what is given 
first of all is not any ontic ground but the Being itself as Being, namely the 
presencing of beings. Thus, the first and foremost we have to think is not 
any allegedly ontic ground of the Being of beings or in other words, Being 
misconstrued as the highest and the most universal being, but Being itself 
in its difference from beings.12 Every time a metaphysical theory establishes 
a so called ultimate ground, it forgets that this ground, which supposedly 
produces the Being of beings, before its grounding activity has already been 
given as present, namely it is already in its Being. Thus, Being as Being is 
given ontologically before every type of ontic ground, which metaphysics 
construes as primal. So, in order to think beyond the concept of ground one 
should clearly understand Being in its difference from beings. The under-
7 Ibid., 11-12.
8 Ibid., 12.
9 Ibid., 13.
10 Ibid., 14-8.
11 Ibid., 15-7.
12 Martin Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), 51-80.
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standing of ontological difference is a precondition for surpassing meta-
physics. 
All the same, whereas Heidegger turns against foundationalism, which 
constitutes the very essence of metaphysics, he understands the concept of 
ground in a very narrow sense, as ontic foundation. He does not realize that 
Being itself – namely ontological difference itself – in its self-concealment 
becomes a peculiar, ontological this time, ground both of beings and their 
metaphysically misinterpreted Being.13
 Heidegger introduced ontological difference for the first time in the lec-
ture course Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,14 where he raised the 
question about the distinction between disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of Be-
ing and uncoveredness (Entdeckt-sein or Entdecktheit) of beings. This distinc-
tion is the ontological basis of the difference between Being and beings. In 
the somewhat earlier text Sein und Zeit Heidegger does not refer explicitly 
to the concept of ontological difference although he makes the distinction 
between the disclosedness both of world and Dasein on one hand and the 
uncovering (Entdeckend-sein or Entdeckung) and uncoveredness (Entdeckt-sein 
or Entdecktheit) of beings on the other.15
Heidegger in the aforementioned texts of the early stage of his thought 
deems the understanding (Verständnis) and disclosedness of Being to be the 
conditions of possibility for the uncoveredness of beings. Furthermore, both 
disclosedness and uncoveredness, as a united ontological and noematic whole, 
make possible the empirical manifestation of beings. Thus, inside ontological 
difference Being appears as the ground of the manifestation of beings. 
In the same vein, in some passages of the Heideggerian texts one can 
trace hints of a second alternative understanding of ontological difference, 
which is not the intention of the German philosopher and undermines the pri-
ority of Being over beings. According to this divergent understanding Being 
and beings are in a state of mutual interdependence. This primary mutuality 
wards off the danger of transformation of Being into another, ontological 
this time, ultimate ground.16
As an example, in paragraph 44 of Sein und Zeit Heidegger refers to the 
concept of disclosedness, both of world and of Dasein’s Being. In this para-
graph, disclosedness has an ambiguous relationship with the phenomena of 
13 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 131/28 & 135/31; 
Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 290/219; and Hei-
degger, Die Grundprobleme, 101.
14 Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme, 102.
15 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 220-21 & 344-45.
16 Ibid., 292-3/221; Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme, 466.
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uncovering and uncoveredness of beings.17 In some passages, uncovering and 
uncoverdness of beings are grounded on the disclosedness of the world or, 
in other words, on the existential structure of Being-in-the-world.18 Nonethe-
less, gradually Heidegger moderates the aforementioned hierarchical ground-
ing relationship. He stresses that the existential structure of care involves 
the disclosedness of Dasein and that with it and through it uncoveredness 
of beings takes place. Right after Heidegger becomes more explicit when he 
states that uncoveredness of within-the-world beings is equiprimordial with 
the Being of Dasein and its disclosedness.19 Besides, in Die Grundprobleme der 
Phänomenologie Heidegger states that 
There exists no comportment to beings that would not under-
stand Being. No understanding of Being is possible that would 
not root in a comportment toward beings.20 
The two interdependent phenomena in this passage are based on the 
temporality of Dasein. Here, Heidegger maintains that the understanding of 
Being is not possible without Dasein’s specific ontic comportments, which 
make beings manifest. He juxtaposes directly the ontic with the ontological 
and he states that both are interdependent. Heidegger’s invocation of Das-
ein’s temporality does not overturn this primordial interdependence because 
Dasein’s temporality, which constitutes Dasein’s Being, in our view, is also 
based upon Dasein’s pre-understanding of Being. Thus, temporality, under-
standing of Being and Dasein’s specific comportments seem to be equipri-
mordial. 
In the aforementioned passages, an instance of undecidability arises 
between two alternative understandings. According to the first, disclosed-
ness of Being grounds the ontological phenomena of uncovering and un-
covereness of beings. Furthermore, disclosedness and uncoveredness, as a 
noematic whole, ground the specific empirical manifestations of beings. 
According to the second alternative understanding, disclosedness, uncov-
ering/uncoveredness and empirical revealing are equiprimordial phenomena, 
17 In very broad terms we would say that uncovering concerns the ontological structure of 
Dasein’s revealing comportment, the intentional comporting to or the directing itself toward 
something [Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1979), 48], whereas uncoveredness refers to the intentional-ontological noema, 
the mode of givenness, of the uncovered beings themselves [Martin Heidegger, Logik. Die Frage 
nach der Wahrheit (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 169].
18 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 290/219.
19 Ibid., 292-93/221.
20 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloom-
ington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982), 327.
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namely there is no hierarchical grounding relationship between them. Cer-
tain passages confirm the first alternative understanding, while others the 
second. 
In our view, we could apply here Derrida’s deconstructive method.21 So 
we could assert that in the Heideggerian text itself on the one hand oper-
ates a dominant understanding, which complies with Heidegger’s intentions 
and establishes a hierarchical grounding relationship between disclosedness, 
uncoveredness and empirical manifestation of beings, whereas, on the other 
hand, a secondary, alternative understanding conceals itself under the dom-
inant one, which construes the three aforementioned phenomena as equiva-
lent and interdependent. This second understanding operates beneath surface 
and in parallel to the dominant and in parts of the text it presents itself ex-
plicitly. Both alternatives are present in the text without ever being merged in 
a new single point of view.
As regards the relationship between Being and beings, the same state of 
undecidability characterizes Heidegger’s later thought as well. In Beiträge zur 
Philosophie Heidegger maintains that thinking should overstep the concept 
of ontological difference.22 According to Heidegger, ontological difference 
failed to lead to an authentic understanding of Being as Being insofar, since 
it tacitly begins from present-at-hand beings and consequently it attempts to 
grasp Being itself through beings. Inevitably, the involvement of beings leads 
once again to the metaphysical understanding of Being as presence-at-hand 
and as beingness. Heidegger claims that non metaphysical thinking should 
leap over ontological difference in order to pose directly the question about 
Being not as Being (Sein) anymore but as Beyng (Seyn) and as Event of appro-
priation (Ereignis).23
Beyng refers to the authentic origin and unity of difference. Ereignis as 
the peculiar essence (essential swaying) (Wesung) of Beyng appropriates itself 
in the manner of a continuous and a priori non presence, namely by means 
of a permanent withdrawal which is necessary for the presencing (coming to 
presence) of beings. Ereignis grounds beings through its continuous absence, 
namely through its peculiar state of not being a being. Ereignis grounds in 
the manner of being only a non-present ontological dispensing of presencing 
of beings. Ereignis is not the activity of a fundamental being which produces 
21 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and Lon-
don: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 229; Gerasimos Kakolyris, An Impossible Proj-
ect: Derrida’s Deconstructive Reading As Double Reading: The Case of Grammatology (PhD 
dissertation, University of Essex, 2001), 216-217. 
22 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1989), 250-51.
23 Heidegger, Beiträge, 250-51.
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Beyng; it is the givenness of Beyng out of its own constantly withdrawn es-
sential swaying.24
In Heidegger’s view the absence of ground belongs to the nature of 
abyss, namely to the nature of a groundless ground. Despite the collapse 
of ground itself, the function of grounding does not totally vanishes.25 
However, this happens only on the basis of the impossibility of ground, 
namely on the basis of abyss (Ab-Grund), which is the peculiar essence of 
Ereignis, that is to say the essence of the ontological ground, the ground 
grounds as abyss.26 To the extent that ground is necessarily abyssal, abyss 
is present inside the ground as its essential swaying. The space of the 
absent ground is not empty in the ordinary sense of the word. Marchart 
explains that according to Heidegger the space of ground remains empty 
in the sense of not completely full, namely not able to be completed.27 
Ereignis dwells in the space of a presence that is not able to be fulfilled. 
The character of this peculiar emptiness or, as Derrida would say, the 
incessant delay of completion of Ereignis allows for and provides the 
openness, the clearing (Lichtung)28 of Beyng. Marchart highlights that one 
should not grasp abyss in contradistinction to the notion of ground to the 
extent that the meaning of abyss includes an essential feature of ground, 
grounding itself.29
In our view the effort of Heidegger to disconnect Ereignis from onto-
logical difference leads once again to a state of undecidability. On the one 
hand, Ereignis can be conceived as a version of the necessary impossibility 
of an ultimate ontical ground. In this case, the notion of Ereignis leads 
to the post-foundational stance. On the other hand, one can claim that 
the total dissociation of Beyng and Ereignis from beings and beingness 
compels indeed the thought to tacitly hypostasize Ereignis, namely to 
conceive it as a mysterious substance, as a transcendent hyper-being, as 
a hyper-ground of beings.30 In our view, Marchart overlooks this inherent 
ambiguity of Heidegger’s thought. He tacitly interprets Heidegger’s argu-
ments in a non-foundationalist way and consequently conceives Heideg-
ger in a univocal manner as a precursor of post-foundationalism. In this 
24 Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klosterman, 2007), 8-9, 28; 
Martin Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klosterman, 1977), 337/311-339/313. 
25 Marchart, 18.
26 Heidegger, Beiträge, 29.
27 Marchart, 18; Heidegger, Beiträge, 379.
28 Heidegger, Zur Sache, 80-90.
29 Marchart, 19.
30 Thomas Sheehan, “A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research,” Continental Philosophy Review 
34, no. 2 (2001):189.
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way, Marchart – as examined in the following chapters – fails to recognize 
a hidden foundationalist tendency in his own way of thought as well.
It is our opinion that ontological difference is indispensable. If one over-
steps it, as Heidegger proposes in Beiträge zur Philosophie, then unavoidably 
one will tend to understand Beyng not as authentically different from any 
concept of beingness but as a transcendent hyper-being, a being beyond the 
essence (epekeina tes ousias) like Plato’s agathon, because one’s thought will 
be obliged to provide Beyng, in the manner of negative theology, with a mys-
terious transcendent essence, superior to any other being and thus with a 
non-understandable ontic character. Therefore, we maintain that Heidegger 
tacitly oscillates between the two aforementioned ways of understanding. 
Whereas Heidegger is indeed a precursor of post-foundationalism, he does 
not belong knowingly to it.
III. Political difference and contingency as the necessary impossibility of an 
ultimate grounding
Our thesis is that the notion of political difference expresses in a very effective 
manner and, at the same time, brings to a completion the second alternative 
understanding of ontological difference we have proposed above, which main-
tains that Being and beings are interdependent and equiprimordial. The origin 
and essential sway of Heideggerian ontological difference stands in a realm be-
fore politics to the extent that, according to late Heidegger’s argumentation, 
what gives the difference, Ereignis, is nothing more than an ontological impos-
sibility of presence, which stands before history,31 before any kind of beingness 
and therefore before political action. In Heidegger’s thought the ontological 
grounds the political.
According to Marchart, Heidegger’s theoretical stance can be character-
ized as quasi-transcendental. Heidegger’s ontological analysis involves tran-
scendental elements because it searches for – not any more in Kant’s manner 
the epistemological conditions of understanding but – the ontological condi-
tions of the truth of Being.32
The above mentioned argumentation stresses the significance of contin-
gency not only in Heidegger’s thought but in post-foundationalism in general.33 
Contingency refers to the necessary impossibility of an ultimate foundation. 
This form of contingency is at the same time necessary because the impossibili-
31 Heidegger, Zur Sache, 49-50.
32 John Sallis, “Grounders of the Abyss,” in Companion to Heidegger’s Contribution to Philos-
ophy, ed. Charles E. Scott, Susan Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 185.
33 Marchart, 25-9.
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ty of an ultimate ground is an indispensable condition for the possibility of the 
many, empirical grounds. Nevertheless, if contingency, namely the absence of 
a final ground, which totally guarantees the process of grounding, is necessary 
for the constitution of any form of identity, then this contingency, as qua-
si-transcendental, resides in a realm before and out of history. 
Furthermore, the experience of this necessary contingency, as the aware-
ness of the crisis of the grounding reasons, can always be traced inside his-
tory. Marchart maintains that the notion of the moment of the political34 is 
grounded precisely on the idea of the appearance inside history and on spe-
cific social and political conditions of this quasi-transcendental contingency, 
which itself resides in a realm of history.35 Thus, post-foundationalism reach-
es a peculiar circle. The quasi-transcendental contingency is the condition of 
possibility of the appearance of the moment inside history and in this manner 
grounds history; yet the historical conditions make possible the emergence 
of the moment and thus the experience of the extra-historical and necessary 
contingency. 
Consequently, political difference describes precisely this tension be-
tween, on the one hand, the specific social and political constitutions and, on 
the other hand, their inability to be completed and their impossible ontolog-
ical (and by extension political) ground. Political difference is a trace of the 
necessary contingency, namely of the absence of ultimate political grounds. 
Thus, it refers to the ontological play of the moment of the political, which as 
experience emerges inside history and inside political constitutions and social 
systems in the form of various terms, such as event, freedom, competition, 
whereas, as quasi-transcendental contingency, which constitutes every possi-
ble identity, resides out of history. Marchart claims that modernity as a his-
torical era is characterized precisely by the generalization of the moment of 
the political as the moment of the impossibility of an ultimate grounding.36
 
IV. The problems of the concept of extra-historical contingency
In our view, the idea of a revealment inside history of an already hidden ex-
tra-historical absence of an ultimate grounding leads Marchart back to foun-
dationalism. The absence of an ultimate ground turns into an absolute truth 
and thus into a peculiar, ultimate, ontological ground of history as a whole, 
which in effect is not different from the traditional metaphysical grounds. 
The impossibility of grounding tacitly loses its political character, becomes 
34 John Greville Agard Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), VIII.
35 Marchart, 30-31.
36 Marchart, 33.
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extra-political (like the Heideggerian concepts of Ereignis and Seyn), and re-
turns to the traditional pattern which characterizes all types of metaphysical 
grounding. 
We argue that the impossibility of grounding should not be character-
ized as a peculiar extra-historical foundation, not only because it depends 
on history, namely on the succession of the ontic grounds, in order to be 
what it is, an impossibility, but in effect it is identical to this succession. The 
impossibility of an ultimate grounding is history itself. To say that contin-
gency is extra-historical is to say that history itself is extra-historical.37 In 
this manner, a peculiar hierarchy inside the moment of the political comes 
to the fore between the grounding of extra-historical contingency on the 
one hand and the appearance of the moment inside history on the other 
hand. 
In the way Marchart puts the matter, the empirical appearance of con-
tingency inside history does not affect the peculiar ontological status of this 
contingency. The empirical, the social and the historical do not influence 
reversely the peculiar extra-historical essence (or non-essence) of the on-
tological impossibility of grounding. Thus, the hierarchical relationship be-
tween the ground and the grounded still operates. The empirical revealment 
of contingency and the historical conditions, which make this revealment 
possible, are considered simply as the ratio cognoscendi of the impossibility 
of grounding. They simply reveal contingency. They do not determine or 
produce it. The ontic and social elements do not indispensably permeate 
the ontological one. As such, the concept of political difference itself is 
canceled. There is not any particular reason to replace ontological differ-
ence with political difference or the traditional universal ontology as pri-
ma philosophia with the thought on the political as a regional ontology.38 
Consequently, we insist that the impossibility of an ultimate grounding is 
not extra-historical, since this would mean that it is extra-political as well.
What the concept of political difference could add to the Heideggerian 
analysis on ontological difference and Ereignis is a peculiar interdependence 
between ontological and ontic. Political difference reinforces the tendency 
of modern thought to go beyond foundationalism, because it manifests 
that even this grounding impossibility of an ultimate ground depends essen-
tially on the ontic elements which grounds, namely it depends essentially 
on the changing historical and political conditions as well as social institu-
tions through which contingency comes to the fore. 
37 Of course, history itself is neither something historical nor something extra-historical, for 
example like nature. It is the essence of every historical event; but this essence does not stand 
in a privileged place which exists independently and prior to any specific historical event.
38 Marchart, 165-68.
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In other words, necessary contingency depends on the particular political 
actions in a given historical situation. As a matter of fact, historical condi-
tions and political actions are not simply the ratio cognoscendi of ontolog-
ical contingency, as Marchart implies. They do not simply manifest contin-
gency as something that pre-exists independently of its appearance in history. 
Historical conditions and particular political actions stand in an essential uni-
ty with contingency, or, in other words, they are to a certain degree identical 
with contingency. Political difference leads the distinction between grounded 
and ground or between ontic and ontological to a partial collapse. The ontic 
part of difference permeates in such a way the ontological one that any effort 
to totally distinguish one from the other is impossible. The ontic part and 
the ontological part are still able to operate as distinct notions only inside a 
primary and essential belonging together, in which the peculiarly grounding 
impossibility of an absolute ground and the historical succession of transitory 
grounds constitute two sides of the same coin.
 
V. The ontic-ontological character of political difference
Nevertheless, why one should opt for political difference instead of ontolog-
ical difference? A possible answer could be that in order for the tendency of 
modern thought –that leads to the collapse of the permanent and extra-his-
torical grounds– to be fulfilled, the ontological impossibility itself of such 
grounds, which replaces and at the same time partially plays the role of these 
ultimate foundations, should take a specific, intra-historical, intra-political 
and quasi-ontical form. 
The name and essence of this ontological impossibility should involve 
contingency in beings and at the same time should separate contingency from 
beings. Thus, the term “political difference” gives contingency an undecidable 
ontic-ontological character, which is not able to be completed. One should 
cope with Heidegger’s tendency that totally dissociates Being from beings, 
because this tendency leads to a retrogression to what modern thought en-
deavours to leave behind, namely the ultimate ground of the social. Onto-
logical difference as such belongs to a pure and universal, ontological level, 
strictly distinguished from the level of beings, from politics, technology and 
society. Thus, the concept of ontological difference creates the conditions 
for the transformation of the ontological impossibility of ground into a cryp-
to-substantialized ultimate ground.
On the contrary, in the theoretical framework of political difference what 
precedes, the political, has at the same time both an ontological-grounding 
as well as an ontic-derivative character. Furthermore, what comes next, the 
sphere of politics, the society, the appearance of beings inside social space, 
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has simultaneously both derivative as well as grounding character. The polit-
ical and the politics ground and at the same time dislocate each other in an 
incessant and unstable historical process, which allows no type of fulfilment 
of the social and thus no type of eternal and immutable ground of history.
VI. Political difference and the impossibility of completion of the social
As we have already maintained, specific human political action inside modern 
social institutions does not simply reveal a pre-existing and extra-historical 
contingency. On the contrary, political action inside specific historical con-
ditions constitutes the very possibility of this contingency. Only inside the 
social and political struggles this contingency is possible. The human polit-
ical acting itself is contingent, namely it is free. In its core, it is not bound 
to any ultimate principles or grounds. Acting itself inside specific historical 
conditions establishes its own relative and temporary criteria, which in their 
turn bound it. Thus, contingency should not be understood as an impossibility 
which resides somewhere out of history, or, in other words, somewhere out 
of human acting. 
Marchart maintains that even though all political regimes in all historical 
eras are characterized by an ultimate groundlessness, only in democracy this 
contingency is neither negated nor repressed but, on the contrary, promoted 
as the ground of democratic political order.39 All political regimes, in one 
way or another, have to cope with the necessary contingency of the social. 
Democracy differs from all other regimes only in the way it relates to this 
radical groundlessness. Democracy transforms the impossibility of an ulti-
mate grounding to a peculiar ground, which simultaneously constitutes and 
dislocates itself.40 
Marchart characterizes as ethical and non-political the tendency of dem-
ocratic regimes to accept ultimate groundlessness as necessary.41 In his view, 
this acceptance interrupts the logic of grounding and impedes political ac-
tion. As long as we act, we are all foundationalists. We try to establish new 
grounding criteria and we do not doubt about them. To accept contingency 
means to question the ground and legitimacy of our actions. Thus, democrat-
ic institutions in fact are un-political. 
Marchart’s reasoning takes for granted the assumption that political ac-
tion is necessarily based on temporary grounds, namely on relative and ques-
39 Oliver Marchart, “Democracy and Minimal Politics: The Political Difference and its Conse-
quences,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 110, no. 4, (2001): 967.
40 Martin Saar, “What is Political Ontology,” Krisis. Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 12, 
no. 1 (2012): 82. 
41 Marchart, “Democracy,” 968.
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tionable truths or evaluative criteria, and that one is obliged to accept these 
truths in order to be able to act. At this point a crucial question arises: Do 
these provisional truths, namely these temporary criteria, come to the fore 
due to and during the acting procedure or do they precede political action? 
The thesis that temporary grounding truths precede action and determine it is 
clearly foundationalist. In our opinion, Marchart inconspicuously accepts as 
true the second part of the aforementioned question. 
At this point, we should take into account Hanna Arendt’s view that po-
litical action (praxis) is distinct from poiesis (fabrication)42 exactly because it is 
groundless. Political acting inside public sphere is not based on any extra-po-
litical truths. Even though an actor takes into consideration causes, motives, 
targets or outcomes, a true action is not determined by these elements.43 The 
goal of praxis is praxis itself. Praxis emerges in history only when a free public 
sphere of words and acts comes to the fore. On the contrary, fabrication is 
grounded on pre-existing principles and patterns and its outcome resides in a 
sphere out of fabrication itself. The work of poiesis emerges when fabricating 
procedure comes to its end. 
Moreover, free actions stimulate other free actions in an incessant po-
litical play inside public sphere. Praxis is contingent to the extent that it is 
groundless. In our opinion, Arendt’s view is that this impossibility of ground-
ing does not reside in an extra-historical and extra-political region and, at 
the same time, it neither renders action possible through temporary ontic 
grounds. In Arendt’s thought, groundlessness is political action itself. Onto-
logical contingency is not distinct from political action. Besides, in Arendt’s 
view, every new entrant citizen is integrated in public sphere by acting and 
talking in public. In this manner, it becomes gradually apparent who he is, a 
knowledge that even the new entrant himself is not in the position to pos-
sess in advance.44 Man is born ex nihilo and after his birth, he himself is his 
own beginning. Consequently, through words and actions every newcomer 
becomes part of the human world. This is a second birth,45 through which the 
new citizen undertakes the simple fact of his initial, natural birth. Man, as a 
new beginning, is able to start something new that nobody can predict based 
on the knowledge of his previous acts or of the conditions that we believe 
that affected him. 
42 Jacques Taminiaux, The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker. Arendt and Heidegger, 
trans. Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 1-3, 92-94; Hannah 
Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
156-57, 188, 192, 196.
43 Arendt, 221-230, 232-239. 
44 Ibid., 178, 181-190.
45 Ibid., 176-177, 246-247.
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Marchart, on the contrary, tends to understand political praxis as a pecu-
liar poiein (fabrication); he accepts the necessity of temporary and ungrounded 
grounds, which precede praxis and play the role of the pattern of action. The 
provisional and temporary character of these grounds does not affect their 
fabricating function. Marchart introduces the concept of minimal politics,46 
which describes the minimal necessary preconditions of political action, namely 
collectivity, strategy, conflictuality, organization. Two of these requirements, 
strategy and organization, although they are necessary for the effectiveness of 
action, are intimately related to fabrication. 
Generally speaking, the notion of extra-historical contingency in Marchart’s 
thought, which precedes social institutions and specific political actions takes 
the place of traditional absolute grounds of the social. In this case, the social 
acquires a new immovable ground and a permanent identity. Besides, praxis is 
inconspicuously understood as a peculiar fabrication of the social.
Furthermore, Marchart (and Heidegger mutatis mutandis) could be char-
acterized as a thinker, who underestimates or neglects the specific political 
and social problems in favor of an abstract notion of the political. Lois McNay 
maintains that every form of political ontology or theory of radical democracy 
leads to the problem of “social weightlessness.” According to McNay, all ver-
sions of political ontology introduce a theoretical hierarchy between the onto-
logical/political, which is placed at the top and the ontic/social, which is placed 
at the bottom.47 In this manner, the particular political acts are understood 
as insignificant examples of abstract and contingent ontological possibilities, 
so that questions about the ways or the causes of these actions in the specific 
historical situation become unnecessary.48 
Additionally, McNay maintains that political ontology understands the 
political as a substantial and ahistorical concept which exceeds social reality.49 
In our view, the two aforementioned problems of political ontology concern 
Marchart’s presentation of political difference as well. The tacit hierarchicaliza-
tion and substantialization of political difference lead to a hidden foundational-
ism and to the depreciation of political action. In Marchart’s analysis, political 
action does not constitute political difference every time it is acted. On the 
contrary, it is political difference as an extra-historical and preceding possibility 
that constitutes political action.
46 Marchart, “Democracy,” 971.
47 Lois McNay, The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Dem-
ocratic Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 69; Tom N. Henderson, “Post-foundational 
Ontology and the Charge of Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory: A Response 
to Lois McNay’s: The Misguided Search for the Political,” Brief Encounters 1, no. 1 (2017): 3.
48 McNay, 15; Henderson, 3.
49 McNay, 70; Henderson, 6.
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Tom Henderson in his article “Post-foundational Ontology and the 
Charge of Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory” supports 
the view that Marchart’s presentation of political difference heals the con-
tradictions of political ontology by introducing the mutual interdependence 
between the political and the social.50 Our opinion is that although this inter-
dependence is indeed Marchart’s intention, the introduction of the concept 
of extra-historical and quasi-trancendental contingency undermines his initial 
aim. The extra-historical character of the political renders it a purely onto-
logical possibility without any social or, in the final analysis, political traces. 
Generally speaking, we should recognize the fact that, both in Heidegger’s 
and Marchart’s thought, two alternative understandings operate, namely a 
foundationalist and a post-foundationalist.
In the matter of democracy we would maintain the view that the intro-
duction (not the emergence) of the concept of the absent ground of the so-
cial in modernity produces the possibility (not the certainty) of the establish-
ment of democratic institutions.51 All the same, the tacit substantialization of 
the supposedly extra-historical groundlessness by Marchart could lead under 
certain circumstances to the totalitarian aim of an authentic interpretation of 
the political in a manner similar to Heidegger’s political aim, expressed in the 
notorious Rectorial Address of 1933, for an affirmation by the German Volk 
of its own historical mission and destiny, which was nothing more than the 
authentic understanding of the history of Being through the heroic guidance 
of Volk’s leaders, who can bravely face the abyss (groundlessness) of Being.52
VII. Conclusion
To sum up, we would say that the difference between our view and Marchart’s 
argumentation concerns four crucial points: 1. In Heidegger’s work operate 
two non-reconcilable ways of understanding at the same time, a founda-
tionalist and a post-foundationalist one. Marchart gives prominence to the 
post-foundationalist way as the only appropriate for an authentic under-
standing of Heidegger’s thought. 2. The peculiar ontological foundation we 
described as the impossibility of an absolute grounding is also determined by 
the relative grounds it makes possible. Only on the basis of the incessant 
succession of the temporary historical grounds the constitution of something 
50 Henderson, 8.
51 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Macey (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1988), 17-20; Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought, 93, 95-96, 
and Marchart, “Democracy,” 67-8.
52 Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” in Philosophical and Po-
litical Writings, ed. Manfred Stassen, trans. Karsten Harries (New York-London: Continuum, 
2003), 2-11.
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like an impossibility of an ultimate grounding as the ground of this succes-
sion is possible. In Marchart’s thought this interdependence becomes blurred. 
The relative historical grounds and the social institutions of modernity play 
simply the role of the ratio cognoscendi of the necessary and prevalent ex-
tra-historical contingency. 3. The term “quasi-transcendental contingency” is 
misleading. It refers to a ground which is partly transcendental and partly em-
pirical and ontic. In fact, contingency is determined as regards all its “parts,” 
through and through, by the empirical and the ontological as well. Besides, 
contingency is not extra-historical because that would mean that it is ex-
tra-political too. Despite its inferred permanence and inter-temporality, to 
the extent that it is not only comprehensible but also possible on the basis of 
the historical succession of the relative grounds, contingency is determined 
from the very beginning by history, or, in other words, it is history itself. 4. 
Political difference does not precede political action. There is a mutual rela-
tionship of interdependence between political difference and specific political 
action.
In our opinion the Arendtian analysis of the distinction between praxis and 
poesis could be used as a basis for the reconciliation of the abstract concept 
of the political with the specific empirical and social conditions, problems and 
institutions, or, in other words, for the reconciliation of the ontological free-
dom of the action with the limitations and restraints of the specific social and 
historical conditions. A free political praxis, on the one hand, is groundless 
and independent of any absolute truth or specific cause and motivation but, 
on the other hand, it is held necessarily inside public sphere and always copes 
with specific social and political problems. 
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